An analysis of building a submarine base in the Arctic by Best, Truman J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1988-03
An analysis of building a submarine base in the Arctic
Best, Truman J.











AN ANALYSIS OF BUILDING A









Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
T238723

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b. DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILA8ILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
Distribution is unlimited.
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)




7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City. State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









11 title (include Security Classification) An Analysis of Building A Submarine Base In The
Arctic
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Truman J. Best
13a TYPE OF REPORT
Master's Thesis
1 3b T ME COVERED
FROM TO




16 supplementary notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government
17 COSATI CODES
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP
18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Submarine Base, Cost Analysis
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis is an analysis of building a submarine base in the
Arctic. The analysis addresses the value of a submarine base in the
Arctic in relation to the growing Soviet threat in that region and thefeasibility of constructing and operating such a submarine base.
Location, command and control, force operation, logistic support and
appropriate force size are elements of the analysis. " Also included in
the thesis is the cost effectiveness of the Arctic submarine base bothin peacetime and in wartime situations. Based upon this limited
analysis, such a base appears to be only marginally cost-effective inpeacetime but substantially so in wartime.
20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF A8STRACT
1D UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
R. N. Forrest




)D FORM 1473, 84 mar S3 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
ft U.S. Govfnm.ni Priming Office i 9»6 60S 24.
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited




Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








II. ARCTIC SUBMARINE BASE OPERATIONS 3
A. BASE CONSTRUCTION AND THE LOCATION 3
B
.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 4
C. ARCTIC SUBMARINE FORCE OPERATION 5
D LOGISTICS SUPPORT 6
III. ARCTIC SUBMARINE FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS 8
A. A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH 9
B A RANDOM SEARCH MODEL 10
C. WARTIME LOSES 12
IV. COST ANALYSIS 14




2 Wartime Analysis 15
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS 16
1. Cost Savings Accruing From
Submarines Saved 16




2. Cost Expenditures for the Base.... 19
a. Investment Costs 19
in
•b. Operation and Maintenance
Costs 22
C . Summary 23
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 25
LIST OF REFERENCES 27






This thesis addresses the feasibility of constructing
and operating a U.S. submarine base in the Arctic.
Location, command and control, force operation, logistic
support and appropriate force size are elements that are
considered. Included in the thesis is a limited cost
effectiveness analysis which suggests that such a base
would not be cost effective for peacetime activities but





A Soviet SSBN or SSGN in the Beaufort Sea is within
2400 nautical miles of Omaha, Nebraska. The U.S. has
conducted ASW operations in the Beaufort Sea; however,
Soviet submarines operating in that region are a potential
threat to the U.S. Although technology for various
submarine detecting and tracking systems moves forward,
SSNs are a necessary component of Arctic ASW due to their
under ice capabilities. As seen in Figure 1, no Western
nation has a submarine base in the Arctic region, while the
Soviets have two submarine bases there. These factors
alone suggest that a U.S. submarine base in the Arctic
should be considered.
Factors which should be considered in the evaluation of
an Arctic submarine base are location, command and control,
force operations, force size and logistics support.
These will be analyzed, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, in the following chapters.
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Figure 1. Strategic Arctic Positions
II. ARCTIC SUBMARINE BASE OPERATIONS
A. BASE CONSTRUCTION AND LOCATION
A U.S. submarine base on the north slope of Alaska
could be built using conventional port building concepts.
The Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark,
along with the Soviet Union have already built many ports
in Arctic regions using conventional techniques. However,
they are limited in usage due to extremely cold weather
during winter. Also, yearly port operation and maintenance
costs are very high, in part because of ice forces exerted
on structures that can result in extensive damage.
A possible location for a U.S. submarine base on the
north slope is at Barrow, Alaska, since it is an
established town and the area has been well researched by
Arctic scientists. In addition, there is an air strip at
Barrow which could be used to fly supplies to the base for
logistics support. A temperate climate could be achieved
by placing a dome over the submarine base. A portion of
the dome could be made of a clear skin of reinforced
plastics, and the base could be heated and powered by
natural gas which is present in abundance on the north
slope of Alaska.
In July, 1958, USS Nautilus found a submerged sea
valley in the Pt. Barrow area that presented a deep water
passage beneath the polar pack. Thus, when a submarine
leaving the base reaches this valley, it can safely
submerge and transit to operating areas via the Chukchi Sea
or the Beaufort Sea. On the other hand, the Pt. Barrow
shore is very shallow, being typically only two-thirds of a
meter as far as four miles off shore. This presents a high
cost in dredging the harbor channel.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL
In order to operate a submarine base, some sort of
command and control system must be created. As noted in
Ref. 1, the U.S. needs a high level Navy advocate for
Arctic theater of operations. The advocate envisioned,
Commander Submarine Forces Arctic ( ComSubForArctic ) would
be responsible to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. This
command, headed by a flag officer, would be the focus for
all submarine and intelligence operations in the Arctic
theater.
Although submarine operations are the reason for
establishing ComSubForArctic, Arctic operations involving
SEAL teams and the Marine Corps could also be placed under
the command. Those responsible for Arctic operations must
compete for attention within their own commands in order to
have any influence in the highly specific Arctic warfare
arena. To affect policy, these officers must influence
decisions impinging on Arctic operations in a setting where
their superiors are concerned with operations in a much
larger, more general arena. A more effective solution
would be to assemble each representative of the scattered
Arctic communities on the ComSubForArctic staff where they
could directly influence the Commander. ComSubForArctic
assisted by SEAL team and Marine Corps personnel could
develop plans, institute and conduct exercises, assist in
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, and
facilitate logistics in an appropriate manner as directed
by higher authority to ensure that Navy and national
interests in the Arctic theater were best served.
C. ARCTIC SUBMARINE FORCE OPERATION.
The present U.S. concept of Arctic SSN operations is to
allocate Arctic periods for SSNs deploying from the West
Coast or the East Coast as part of their deployment
schedule. There are no submarines specifically designated
for Arctic SSN operations.
The proposed concept of Arctic operation is similar to
the present U.S. SSBN operations in that there would be
rotating crews for the submarine force. For example, three
crews might be assigned to two submarines. Each SSN would
make a five month deployment and would have a two month
inport period for minor repairs and proper turnover to the
rotating crew, then the SSN would go out for another five
month deployment. Each deployment would consist of two
months in an operating area, then one month of training and
readiness exercises, visits to foreign ports, possibly in
Norway or Scotland for liberty, and finally a return to the
operating area for an additional two months.
With this concept, a submarine would be present in the
Arctic Ocean 16 months out of 26 months of operation, at
the end of which it would enter drydock for four months for
repairs and overhaul. It would then restart the rotation.
Thus, for a 30 months cycle, a submarine would spend 16
months in the Arctic Ocean. This would meet the Chief of
Naval Operations' requirement that personnel spend less
than 50% of their time away from their home port, while
maintaining a significant presence in the Arctic. Also,
with this concept, submarines operating in the Arctic Ocean
should be more effective since crews would become more
familiar with the Arctic environment.
D. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
The next consideraion is to determine the operational
requirement of the base. For instance, what type of
support facilities should the base contain? In order to be
an effective operating base, it should have the capability
to support all minor repairs and some major repairs on
SSNs. Although it should not be necessary to build a base
with complete overhaul capability, a base should have an
intermediate maintenance activity support level. The base
could maintain one dry dock for extensive periodic
maintenance between overhauls. For example, to repair
damaged screws and sonar domes, since the probability of
screw and sonar dome damage would be greater under the ice
than in the open ocean as a result of surfacing and moving
through ice.
Since the Arctic submarine force would conduct all
Arctic operations, personnel could be made available from
the other U.S. submarine bases that currently support
Arctic operations. However, personnel assignments to the
Arctic base could be a major problem, especially to the
married person. Not many families would choose to live in
the Arctic. However, if proper provisions were made for a
comfortable family life, an Arctic assignment might be
quite acceptable.
One way this might be accomplished is by constructing
an adjacent dome that contains apartments for both married
and single people, schools for children through high
school, a navy exchange and commissary, and some
recreational facilities.
Many of the necessities for life and proper operation
of the base could be flown into the Barrow air strip. From
there, helicopters or trucks could be used for transport to
the submarine base.
III. ARTIC SUBMARINE FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS
This thesis is based on the assumptions that the
primary objective of the Arctic Submarine Force is to
neutralize the threat of the Soviet SSBN and SSGN forces of
the Soviet Northern Fleet in the event of an armed conflict
with the Soviet Union. This means that a U.S. submarine
base in the Arctic should be large enough to support a
submarine force sufficient to counter the Northern Fleet
SSBN and SSGN forces. This thesis will concentrate on the
SSBN forces.
As of 1986, the northern SSBN fleet consisted of four
Typhoons and 11 Delta III/IV [Ref . 1] . Also, the Soviets
are building one Typhoon class and one Delta IV class SSBN
per year [Ref. 2]. If this rate continues, by 1995, the
Soviets will have seven more Typhoons and Delta IVs.
Assuming the present force allocation of 65% of SSBNs to
the Northern Fleet, by 1995 the Northern Fleet might have
as many as 9 Typhoons and 16 Delta III/IVs.
Two simple force size analyses are presented next.
Both analyses are based on the assumption that there will
be no change in force requirements in other areas of world.
The first analysis is the more conservative one.
A. THE FIRST FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS
Due to Soviet advances in submarine quieting, acoustic
sensors, and weapons, U.S. submarines may no longer enjoy
the degree of superiority that they have had over their
Soviet counterparts in the 1960s and the 1970s. This
analysis is used to calculate the force size for a worst
case condition in which the capabilities of Soviet SSBNs
approach that of U.S. SSNs.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. The U.S. will deploy as many SSNs as the Soviets
deploy SSBNs.
2. The Soviets will have 25% of their SSBNs in
station at all times.
3. Without a submarine base in the Arctic, the U.S.
Arctic submarine forces will use a six months
deployment cycle, six months deployed, six months
inport
.
4. By 1995, the Northern Fleet will have 25 deployable
SSBNs.
Thus, at any one time there would be seven SSBNs,
(.25 * 25 = 6.25 = 7 SSBNs), deployed under the ice.
Therefore, the U.S. would need to maintain seven SSNs in
the Arctic. Given that it takes 15 days (this is discussed
in a later section), for a U.S. SSN to transit to the
Arctic from its nearest SSN base, an SSN would operate in
the Arctic five months out of a year. Then, in order to
maintain seven SSNs continously, which equates to 7 * 12 =
84 submarine months per year, an Arctic submarine force
needs 84 / 5 = 16.8 = 17 submarines. However, with a
submarine base in the Arctic and the Arctic submarine force
operation concept, the U.S. submarine force size
requirement would be decreased as will be seen in the next
section.
B. THE SECOND FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS
This analysis is based on a random search model. The
model represents a theoretical search in which the least
information is known about a target and no systematic
search plan is used [Ref. 3]. Thus, the force size
calculated based on this method is also conservative.
ASSUMPTIONS.
1. Without the submarine base in the Arctic, U.S.
forces will use a 6 months deployment cycle.
2. The total area of the Arctic Ocean is 3.3
million square miles; however, the area is
subdivided into individual SSBN operating areas
of equal size.
3. U.S. submarines' search efforts are independent.
4. The best search speed for an SSN is 15 kts.
5. The "cookie cutter" sweep width of a U.S. SSN
sonar against a Soviet SSBN is 12 NM.
6. An equal number of SSNs is deployed to each SSBN
operating area.
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7. The U.S. requires probability P of at least one
detection for each deployed Soviet SSBNs in a 60
day period.
The model can be stated as follows:
P = 1 - EXP(-WL(N/n) / (A/n))
where
W = sweep width.
L = total distance searched by a SSN.
A = total area of the Arctic Ocean.
N = the number of submarines needed.
n = number of deployed Soviet SSBNs.
or P = 1 - EXP[ -WLN / A ] [Ref.3]
and N = -(A/WL) * ln(P)
Thus, N is independent of n for this model and the
number of SSNs required is the same whether the Soviets
deploy one SSBN or ten SSBNs.
Example : Assume 1 SSBN is deployed and P = .
5
Then A = 2.557 mil. sq. nm, since 1 nm = 1.136 miles,
3.3 mil.sq. miles = 2.557 mil. sq. nm
L = 60 days * 24 hrs/day * 15 kts = 21600 nm
and N = .693 * A / W*L
= .693 * 2557000 / (12 * 21600)
= 6.84 = 7 submarines are needed.
Therefore, the Arctic submarine force size without the
Arctic submarine base must provide, 7 * 12 = 84 submarine
months and this requires, 84 submarine months / 5 months =
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16.8 = 17 SSNs.
Question: If P = . 8 or P = .3, what is the force
size?
For P = .8, N = 1.61 * 2557000 / 12 (21600)
= 15.8 = 16 submarines.
Then, the force size must provide, 16 * 12 = 192 submarine
months and this requires, 192 / 5 = 38.4 = 39 SSNs.
For P = .3, N = .357 * 2557000 / 12 (21600)
= 3.5 = 4 submarines.
Then, the force size must provide, 4 * 12 = 48 submarine
months and this requires, 48 / 5 = 9.6 = 10 SSNs.
The remainder of the thesis is based on the first
force size analysis, since it is sensitive to the number of
SSBNs deployed, and the analysis is based on Soviets'
deploying seven SSBNs in peacetime and ten SSBNs in
wartime.
C. WARTIME LOSSES
The probability that a U.S. SSN will be lost while
transiting through Soviet SSN barriers and mine fields at
choke points to the Arctic Ocean is assumed to be .2 per
transit. Given a patrol force of ten SSNs and a five-month
patrol period, 24 transits per year will be required, and
this will result in an expected loss of 24 * . 2 = 4. 8 or 5
12
SSNs per year. This number will be used in a later
analysis.
The number of the U.S. SSNs lost under the conditions
considered might vary significantly depending on actual
Soviet capabilities; however, with the above assumptions,
the U.S. will lose on the order of five submarines per year
from the Soviet barriers to the Arctic Ocean.
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IV. COST ANALYSIS
A. ARCTIC SUBMARINE BASE EFFECTIVENESS
Is building a submarine base in the Arctic cost
effective? The cost effectiveness analysis of the Arctic
submarine base will be based on the approximate cost of
building and operating the submarine base versus the number
of submarines saved by operating from the Arctic base. The
analysis considers two situations in the year 1995, a
peacetime situation and wartime situation.
1 . Peacetime Analysis
ASSUMPTION: In 1995, the Soviets deploy seven SSBNs in
the Arctic Ocean.
Then from calculations in the previous chapter, the
U.S. would need to maintain seven SSNs to counter the SSBN
threat. Without the base in the Arctic, the U.S. needs 17
submarines to maintain continuous presence of seven
submarines, but with the base only 14 submarines are
required. (With the Arctic submarine force operation, a
submarine operates in the Arctic Ocean 16 months out of a
30 month cycle. Since maintaining seven submarines
continously requires 7 * 30 = 210 submarine-months per
cycle, 210 / 16 = 13.125 = 14 submarines are needed.).
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This equates to a savings of three submarines.
Question: What is the submarine savings if the
Soviets deployed four SSBNs?
Then, from the first force size analysis, the U.S. would
need to maintain four SSNs to counter the threat. Without
the base in the Arctic, the U.S. needs ten submarines, but
with the base only eight submarines are required, since
maintaining four submarines continuously require 4 * 31 =
124 submarine-months per cycle, 124 / 16 = 7.75 = 8
submarines. This equates to a savings of two submarines.
2 . Wartime Analysis^
ASSUMPTIONS:
a. The Soviets deploy ten SSBNs.
b. The conflict lasts for one year.
c. Without an Arctic submarine base, the U.S. Arctic
submarine force uses deployment cycle of five months
operation in the Arctic, resupply for one month at
the home port and operate for another five months.
The nearest U.S. attack submarine base to the
Arctic is Groton, Connecticut, which is approximately 4300
NM to the Arctic submarine operating area. Transiting at
average speed of 12 kts, it would take a submarine on the
order of 15 days to reach its operating area. Thus, in a
five-month operating period, an SSN would be on station
for only four months and a submarine will be in the Arctic
eight months per year. Then, in order to maintain ten
submarines continuously for one year, which equates to 12
15
months * 10 submarines = 120 submarine-months, the U.S.
would need 120 submarine-months / 8 months = 15
submarines. In addition, five more submarines are needed
to account for the wartime loses as calculated in the
previous section. Thus, the U.S. would need a total of 20
SSNs.
On the other hand, with the Arctic submarine base
operation concept, a submarine could spend five months on
deployment, come back to the base, allow one month to
resupply and exchange the crew and deploy again for five
months. In this case, the submarine would spend ten months
out of a year under the ice. With this concept, only 12
submarines are needed to maintain ten submarines in the
Arctic area continuously. Thus, the submarine savings are
eight submarines in wartime situations
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS
1 . Cost Savings Accruing From Submarines Saved
ASSUMPTIONS:
a. In 1995, the average cost of a modified Los Angeles
class submarines cost 800 million dollars each.
b. Annual operating and maintenance cost of an SSN is
ten percent of the procurement cost.
c. Discount rate (r) is ten percent for all years.
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d. The size of Arctic submarine base is four times as
large as the Astrodome.
e. A multiplication factor of 1.5 to 2.5 in cost is
used to account for the Arctic weather and the
transportation of building materials.
f. The average inflation rate between 1965 to 1995 is
6.5%.
g. Operation and maintenance cost of the U.S.
submarine force is 25% of the total U.S. Navy's
operation and maintenance cost.
h. The useful life of a submarine is 30 years.
a. Peacetime Analysis.
From the previous section, the number of
submarines saved in peace time was three when the Soviets
deployed seven SSBNs; thus, this equates to a savings of
2.4 billion dollars in 1995. Since Los Angeles class SSNs
are built four per year, discounting is not used. In
addition, the annual operating and maintenance cost
discounted to 1995 dollars is calculated using the present
value formula [Ref.5].
(1) PV = SUM ( Ai / (1 + r)**i ) i = 1 ... n
where
PV = present value.
Ai = cost at year i.
r = discount rate,
n = total number of years.
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Using the above formula, with the constant discount rate of
10% and Ai = 2.4 billion * .1 = 240 million dollars for all
30 years, the operation and maintenance cost is
approximately 2.3 billion 1995 dollars. Thus, the total
savings from the Arctic submarine base is 4.7 billion
dollars. Therefore, if the submarine base construction and
operation costs are less than 4.7 billion in 1995, it could
be cost effective.
If the Soviets deploy only four SSBNs, then the
submarine savings is two submarines, which equates to a
savings of 1.6 billion dollars in 1995. Also, using
equation ( 1 ) , the operating and maintenance cost is
approximately 1.5 billion 1995 dollars. Thus, the total
savings from the Arctic submarine base is 3.1 billion
dollars.
b. Wartime Analysis.
The submarine savings from the Arctic base
operation in wartime, from the previous analysis, was
three submarines. Also, there are approximately five
submarines lost per year from Soviet SSN barriers and the
mine fields at the Arctic choke points. Thus, the total
submarines saved might be eight submarines for a one year
campaign. This equates to savings of approximately 12.6
billion 1995 dollars.
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2. Cost Expenditures for the Base
a. Investment Costs
Since there are no facilities that are
equivalent to an indoor submarine base, a rough
approximation of the investment cost will be derived using
a formula that gives an order of magnitude cost estimate
and the cost of the Astrodome in Houston, Texas as the base
case [Ref . 4]
.
A formula which can be used for scaling up or
down structure costs is:
Cx = Ck * (Ex / Ek)**n
where
Cx = cost of item of size Ex
Ck = cost of item of size Ek
n = cost capacity exponent ( = .85 [Ref .4])
The Astrodome in Houston, Texas, built in 1965,
cost $31.6 million dollars. Its overall size is 216 meters
by 216 meters, the outside wall is 66 meters high, and the
diameter of the dome is 196 meters. Assume an Arctic
submarine base with proper facilities to support 14
submarines can be built on a lot size of 432m by 432m, have
a height of 66m and a dome diameter of 400m. This facility
then would be four times as large as the Astrodome.
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From the above formula, the investment cost of
the Arctic submarine base in 1965 dollars is 102.7 million:
Cx = 31,600,000 * (4)**. 85 = 102.7 Mil.
Since construction cost in the Arctic is not comparable
with that in a temperate climate, and to account for the
large transportation cost for the building materials, a
multiplication factor of 1.5 to 2.5 is used for the Arctic
submarine base construction. Using these factors, the cost
would be about 102.7 mil * 1.5 = 154.05 mil. to 102.7 mil *
2.5 = 256.75 million in 1965 dollars for the base.
Assuming the Astrodome would be large enough
for the living quarters then, an additional 31.6 mil * 1.5
= 47.4 to 31.6 mil * 2.5 = 79 million dollars would be
required. So, the total investment cost for the Arctic
submarine base might be 201.5 to 335.75 million in 1965
dollars.
The $335.75 million in 1965 dollars can be
converted to 1995 dollars by adjusting for inflation. The
average inflation over the 30 years is assumed to be about
6.5% [Ref. 5]. Then,
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C[in 95] = C[in 65] * (1 + .065)**n
where
C[in 95] = cost in 1995
C[in 65] = cost in 1965
n = number of years
Using this formula, 335.75 million in 1965 is
equvalent to 2.22 billion in 1995. Likewise, 201.5 million
is equivalent to 1.33 billion in 1995. The estimated
accuracy of the "order of magnitude estimate" is -30%, +50%
[Ref. 4], Thus, the cost might range between .9 billion to
3.33 billion 1995 dollars.
In addition, although the Astrodome has some
buildings included, extra building facilities would be
needed for the submarine base operations. Adding an extra
investment cost of .5 billion in 1995 dollars to account
for this, the total investment cost of the base might range
between 1.4 to 3.83 billion 1995 dollars.
If the Soviets deployed only four SSBNs in
peace time, the Arctic submarine force size need to be only
eight SSNs. However, in wartime the Soviets would most
likely increase the number of SSBNs deployed. Therefore,
the submarine base size will still be the same, which
implies that the investment cost of the submarine base
might range from 1.4 to 3.83 billion 1995 dollars.
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b. Operation and Maintenance Costs
The operational cost of the proposed Arctic
submarine base is calculated using the 1987 Navy budget
request, which was 94 billion dollars. Ten percent of 94
billion was for the operation and maintenance of all U.S.
Navy support facilities [Ref. 2]. Since the submarine
force comprise approximately 25 percent of the U.S. Navy,
25 percent of the total operations and maintenance cost
will be spent on submarine base operations. The U.S.
submarine force size is about 130 submarines, so the
operation and maintenance cost of a submarine base with 14
submarines might be approximately one-tenth of the total
submarine base operation costs. Then, the operation and
maintenance cost of the Arctic submarine base might be ( for
30 years), again using formula (1), approximately 2.24
billion in 1987 dollars; if the Arctic factor of 1.5 to 2.5
is considered, then, the cost would range between 3.36
billion to 5.6 billion in 1987 dollars. This is equivalent
to about 5.56 to 9.27 billion in 1995 dollars, again using
a constant 6.5% annual inflation rate.
In addition, there would be varying costs of
channel and harbor dredging, ice breaking and defense
systems for the submarine base. These costs might range
from one to three billion 1995 dollars, based on the
dredging costs, the amount of ice breaking needed and the
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defense system costs. Thus, the total cost of the Arctic
submarine base might range from approximately eight to 16
billion dollars.
If the Soviets deploy four SSBNs, the Arctic
submarine force size is eight SSNs. Then, the operation
and maintenance cost would range between 3.2 to 5.3 billion
1995 dollars. The cost of dredging, ice breaking, and
defense systems would still remain about the same one to
three billion 1995 dollars. Thus, the total cost of the
submarine base might range 5.6 to 12.2 billion 1995
dollars.
C. SUMMARY
Table 1 indicates that the Arctic submarine base is not




COST SAVINGS AND EXPENDITURES (1995 DOLLARS)
Peacetime(4) Peacetime(7) Wartime(lO)
cost savings 3.1 bil. 4.7 bil. 12.6 bil.
investment cost 1.4 to 3.8 billion
& M cost 4.2 - 8.3 bil. 6.6 - 12.3 bil.
cost expenditure 5.6 - 12.1 bil. 8.0 - 16.1 bil.
* The number in parenthesis indicates the number of
SSBNs deployed.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The cost analysis of the thesis indicates that an
Arctic submarine base is likely to be not cost effective
during peace time, 4.7 billion cost savings versus 8.0 to
16.1 billion cost expenditure; however, it would likely be
cost effective in war time, in which case the cost savings
are 12.6 billion. In any case, the decision to build a
submarine base in the Arctic should not be based on cost
alone.
The other benefit of having a submarine base might be
more effective ASW in that region, since the crew would be
familiar with the environment. Also, the Los Angeles class
submarines equipped with land attack Tomahawk missiles just
outside of the Soviet territory might be a significant
strategic deterrent against the Soviets.
On the other hand, the Soviets might consider the U.S.
Arctic submarine base as a threat to their national
security; consequently, they might build up their Arctic
submarine force even larger. That might start a strategic
arms race in the Arctic.
In a report by former Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman, it is stated, "For purpose of deterrence, crisis
management, and diplomacy, we must be present in the areas
25
where we would have to fight if war broke out."[Ref. 2]
This suggests that the U.S. needs to increase its presence
in the Arctic. An Arctic submarine base is one option for
increasing the U.S. presence there. The cost analysis of
this thesis is very rough. It might be within a factor of
two to three of the real costs. However, it provides a
starting point for an in-depth analysis of the cost
effectiveness of building a submarine base in the Arctic.
26
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. "Fighting Subs Under the Ice" MG Edward B.Atkeson, USA
(Ret), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland,
Proceedings
, Sept., 1987.
2. Navy Internal Relations Activity, Report to the
Congress, Fiscal Year 1986 and 1987.
3. U.S. Naval Institute, Naval Operations Analysis
,
p. 127, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1977.
4. Humphreys, K. K. and Wellman, P., Basic Cost
Engineering, pp. 8 - 12, Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1987.
5. Fabrycky, W. J. and Thuesen, G. J., Engineering
Economy




1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Professor R. N. Forrest, 55Fo
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Professor Dan C. Boger, Code 54Bo
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. Truman J. Best
Naval Sub School Code 20
SOAC - Class 88060, Box 700
Groton, Connecticut 06349


















cl An analysis of building
a submarine base in the
Arctic.
&> "*<,£
a?^j

